Globalization has changed job opportunities in much of the developing world. In India, outsourcing has created a new class of high-skill jobs which have increased overall returns to schooling. Existing evidence suggests education broadly responds to this change. We use microdata to evaluate the impact of these jobs on local school enrollment. We merge panel data on school enrollment from a comprehensive school-level administrative dataset with detailed data on Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) center location and founding dates. Using school fixed effects, we find that introducing a new ITES center causes a 5.7% increase in the number of children enrolled in primary school; this effect is localized to within a few kilometers. We show the effect is driven by English-language schools, consistent with the claim that the impacts are due to changes in returns to schooling. Supplementary survey evidence suggests that the localization of the effects is driven by limited information diffusion. * Seema Jayachandhran, Robert Jensen, Larry Katz, Andrei Shleifer and participants in seminars at the University of Chicago provided helpful comments. We are grateful to Perwinder Singh for excellent research assistance.
Introduction
In the last thirty years, globalization has dramatically changed job opportunities in the developing world. In many countries this change has increased the skill premium. In India, the focus of this paper, this change has been particularly striking. The number of individuals employed in outsourcing-related businesses has increased from roughly 50,000 in 1991 to over 2 million in 2010 (NASSCOM, 2010) ; these jobs demand employees with high levels of education and a good command of English, and pay high salaries by Indian standards. The availability of these new opportunities increases the return to education which may, in turn, increase school enrollment. The magnitude of this change is unclear, but is important for understanding one of the major consequences of globalization. 1 Existing evidence on India suggests that, broadly, education has increased as outsourcing-related jobs have become more important. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) show evidence of increased returns to English in Bangalore between 1980 and 2000, and simultaneous increases in English-language enrollment among groups best able to take advantage of new job opportunities. Shastry (2010) shows evidence of school enrollment increases in districts with significant IT growth over the 1990s. On a more micro level, Jensen (2010) uses a randomized intervention to show that school enrollment for girls responds to call center recruiting services in Delhi.
What the existing results cannot tell us is to what extent these changes reflect reaction to specific job opportunities as opposed to broader responses to globalization in general. This has important implications for understanding whether increases in education will be concentrated in areas right near the new jobs (e.g. Bangalore, Hyderabad) or whether they will extend out to smaller cities and more underdeveloped areas. This relates to the question of whether these changes will ameliorate or exacerbate inequality across areas. 2 Further, to the extent that these impacts are concentrated in areas around the new jobs, understanding the mechanism behind this localization may be informative about policies which could broaden the impacts.
In this paper we address these questions using data on Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) firms in India. 3 In the first part of the paper we use a panel dataset on school enrollment to estimate the causal impact of ITES center introduction on schooling. 4 We find large positive impacts of these centers on school enrollment, particularly in English language schools. These impacts are very localized: they do not operate for ITES centers more than a few kilometers away. We argue these impacts reflect changes in perceived returns to schooling. In the second part of the paper we use survey data to argue that the localized impacts are likely due to limited information diffusion about these jobs. This suggests that policies which improve information about job opportunities may increase educational attainment.
We begin with panel data on enrollment at the school level from a comprehensive administrative dataset in three states in India (Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu); each school is observed for a period of four to eight years between 2001 and 2008. We combine this with a newly collected dataset on ITES business locations and founding dates. 5 Our ITES center location data allows us to identify the PIN code (similar to a zip code) location of each center, which we can link to school location. We use a school fixed effects estimator to analyze how enrollment changes within an individual school upon the introduction of a new ITES center to the area.
We begin by estimating the impact of ITES center introduction on schools in the same PIN code. We find strong positive effects which occur quickly: the introduction of one additional ITES center to the PIN code is associated with a 5.7% increase in number of children enrolled in the school in the year after the center introduction. 6 Our primary regressions control for school fixed effects, several time-varying school infrastructure controls and year fixed effects interacted with state dummies and village/neighborhood demographics. Our effects are robust to controlling for district specific trends, and are similar if we restrict to areas with any English-language schools or to areas which ever have ITES centers during the sample period.
We next estimate how localized these impacts are. We define two new variables: number of ITES centers in the two closest PIN codes (an average of 3.2 kilometers away from the local PIN code) and number of ITES centers in the 3rd to 5th closest neighbors (an average of 5.8 kilometers away). 7 ITES centers in the two closest neighboring PIN codes also have a positive impact on school enrollment, but it is smaller and less significant than the own-PIN code effects. The slightly further ITES centers have no significant impact. This suggests that the effects are extremely localized.
The primary issue with interpreting these results causally is the possibility of pre-trends. The inclusion of school fixed effects in our specification addresses the concern that ITES center introduction is associated with some fixed area characteristic, but they do not address the concern that ITES centers might be introduced to areas which are changing more rapidly. 8 To address this, we look directly for pre-trends in the data by estimating the impact of ITES center introduction in 5 We exclude the major cities of Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad where outsourcing businesses are so common that it is unrealistic to consider the introduction of such businesses as representing a change in job options. 6 Based on other data (the National Family and Health Survey) enrollment rate in this period is around 75% at primary-school ages. Given this level, our results imply about a 4.1 percentage point increase in enrollment rate. 7 We define distances using GPS data on PIN codes; the GPS data gives the location of the post office for that PIN code. When we report distances, we therefore report the distance between the post offices in neighboring PIN codes. 8 We should note that we have no reason to think this type of endogenous placement is common. Conversations with ITES center operators suggested they choose where to locate primarily based on the level of infrastructure and the quality of possible employees, but there was no mention of locating based on trends. future years. 9 The inclusion of the future ITES center measure does not affect our estimate of the impact of current ITES centers and, more importantly, future ITES centers are never a significant predictor of school enrollment. As a further test, we show that there are no trends in enrollment in years leading up to an ITES center introduction.
Following our estimates of the overall impacts of ITES centers, we explore whether these impacts vary by language of instruction. Jobs in ITES centers almost universally require knowledge of English in addition to high levels of education. Consistent with this, we find that enrollment in English-language schools increases by about 15% with the introduction of each ITES center, whereas there is no change for local-language schools. Further, we argue that the impact for English-language schools should be particularly strong when the ITES center that is introduced is a call center (as opposed to data processing), since this type of center requires a better command of English. This is apparent in the data. The impact of a voice ITES center on an English-language school is 16.4%; this is in comparison to -3.6% for a local language school. The difference for non-voice centers is much smaller: 12.4% for English-language schools versus 9.1% for local-language schools.
These results point to a causal impact of ITES centers on school enrollment, but leave open the possibility that the impacts are due to mechanical changes in population or income resulting from ITES centers. In particular, we are concerned about three issues: changes in population, changes in number of schools and changes in income. We argue that these factors do not explain our results. Most importantly, although ITES centers do increase income, a simple calibration using estimates of the income elasticity of school enrollment suggests that only a small fraction of our enrollment increases could be explained by income changes.
We therefore interpret our results as reflecting a reaction to changes in returns to schooling. In Section 5 we explore the mechanism by which this occurs. We distinguish two possibilities. First, the introduction of an ITES center may impact actual returns to schooling by providing new jobs at that center. Alternatively, it may impact perceived returns to schooling by providing better information about these jobs in general, even if the change in actual job opportunities is limited. The fact that the impacts we see are very localized helps us distinguish between these explanations. The first story can explain our findings only if labor markets are extremely localized and migration is extremely constrained, in both cases to within a few kilometers. Similarly, the second story can explain our findings only if information is extremely localized.
To separate these, we use data from a survey conducted in one district in Tamil Nadu (Madurai), which allows us to observe (a) the localization of the labor market and (b) how widely information diffuses. We find evidence in favor of the information story. Our data suggests people travel significant distances for work and that their children often live some distance away in adulthood. This suggests that the impacts of a new ITES center on actual returns to schooling would not be limited to children growing up in the area right around the ITES center. In contrast, the data on information suggests knowledge is very localized. Even limiting the sample to individuals who live within one kilometer of an ITES center we find that those who are closer are more likely to report they know of a center in the local area, and more likely to correctly identify what qualifications are required for the job. Further, a larger share to report that their child is likely to have a call center job. Although this evidence is less conclusive than the central results on enrollment, it is at least suggestive of the conclusion that the localized impacts we observe reflect slow information diffusion.
The findings in this paper relate to a large literature on what policies are effective in increasing school enrollment in the developing world (e.g. Duflo, 2001; Kremer, 2003; Chaudhury et al., 2005; Duflo, Hanna and Ryan, 2009; Burde and Linden, 2009 ). Our work is supportive of existing evidence from India (Jensen, 2010b) and the Dominican Republic (Jensen, 2010a) which suggests that policies which inform people about returns to schooling may increase enrollment. 10 The results here suggest that the very presence of job opportunities may be enough to prompt changes in local area schooling, while supporting the claim that policies which provide better information may be effective in promoting school enrollment in areas further from new job options. 11 Although this paper focuses on the case of India, the results may well have implications for other countries. In the broadest sense, they suggest that poor understanding of job opportunities is a potentially important factor in limiting school enrollment in the developing world.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on ITES centers, and describes the data. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. Section 4 shows the 10 Our work is most closely related Jensen (2010b), who evaluates a randomized intervention which provided call center recruiting services in the area around Delhi. He finds the interventions produce increases in school enrollment and weight among girls. Relative to Jensen (2010b) , our work provides a clearer picture of changes which are likely to result without any formal intervention; we also have richer data on schooling. However, without randomization our study relies on stronger identification assumptions.
11 An caveat to this policy argument is that our results hinge on the fact that jobs in ITES centers require additional education; Atkin (2009) finds that growth in the export sector in Mexico actually leads to school dropout since export jobs pay well but do not require schooling. central results of the paper. Section 5 discusses mechanisms and Section 6 concludes.
Background and Data

Background on ITES Centers
Although the concept of "outsourcing" business processes to low-wage countries has been around since the 1970s, the industry remained small until the late 1990s, as time and cost restrictions were large. With the investment in trans-oceanic fiber-optic cables however, the costs of ITES off-shoring plummeted, and with its relatively educated English-speaking low-wage population, India emerged as the dominant provider of business services ranging from call centers to software development. Only about 5,000 workers worldwide were employed in this sector in 1986; by 2010, this number had increased to 2.3 million in India alone (NASSCOM, 2010) .
ITES center jobs are typically high-paying by Indian standards. The average starting salary at such firms is in the range of 8,000 rupees per month (about US$175), which is almost double the average per capita income of India (Ng and Mitter, 2005) . These firms typically come in two types: multinational corporations with subsidiaries or divisions located in India, and Indian "third-party" firms that provide ITES centers and other services for Western companies. Jobs at the Indian firms tend to have lower wages, higher turnover, and less training than the "in-house" multinational corporation positions (Dossani and Kenney, 2004) . The majority of ITES firms are in larger cities such as Bangalore, Delhi, and Mumbai, but they are spreading rapidly to smaller cities all over southern India. Workers at these firms are primarily young, and a large share are women (Ng and Mitter, 2005) .
Many of these firms are call centers, which focus on direct telephone interaction with Western customers. Workers make outgoing calls (for services like telemarketing), and take incoming calls (for customer service, tech support, and credit card activation, among other things) for large Western companies. At these centers, "voice" workers conduct calls almost entirely in English, primarily to the United States; thus, fluency is generally a requirement for entry-level positions. 12 Other, "non-voice" business processes outsourced to such firms range greatly in their skill-level, from data entry to software design. English proficiency may not be required for these jobs, though in our survey almost all non-voice centers reported that English was required.
From the perspective of this paper, there are at least two central features of ITES centers which we want to highlight. First, they require relatively high rates of education and pay high wages.
To the extent that jobs of this type have not been available historically, their existence may well affect the returns to education (both perceived and actual). Second, the vast majority of these jobs require English skills, which is likely to affect the wage returns to learning English.
Data on School Enrollment (DISE)
We use a large administrative dataset on primary school enrollment in India called the District Information System for Education (DISE). This dataset has been collected by the Indian government since the late 1990s, although the data used in this paper begins in the early 2000s. Data collection is coordinated at the district level, and involves surveys of schools. These school surveys have several parts. First, they collect data on primary school enrollment, including comprehensive data on number of enrolled students by age, grade, gender and caste. These data are designed to reflect statistics as of September 30th of the school year (which starts in the spring). Second, they collect data on features of the school, including language of instruction and physical plant characteristics.
Each school is given a unique ID number which allows us to follow schools over time.
The village-level survey is less comprehensive and less frequent, but includes some information on village or neighborhood characteristics. 13 Most importantly, for most areas in this survey we observe the PIN code location of the neighborhood/village, which allows us to match the area to ITES center locations. A PIN code is similar to a ZIP code in the US; they are larger than a village, but not as large as a census block. In these data, the median PIN code has 10,000 children enrolled in primary school.
The DISE data is collected by the district and then aggregated by each state government. We use data from three states that have been significantly impacted by globalization: Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. 14 The number of years of data varies across states. Panel A of Table 1 shows, for each state, the years of data coverage and the range of number of schools by year.
In later years the dataset is more comprehensive, covering a larger share of schools. Although this 13 We will often refer to "villages" as the area identifier, but it is important to keep in mind that in many cases this is not a "village" but a "neighborhood" or ward in a town or city.
14 These three are also states in which we have a relatively long time series of data; although we have access to data for the entire country, in most states they cover only two to three years. means we do not have a balanced panel, by including school fixed effects we ensure that we compare the same schools over time. Table 1 provides some summary statistics on school enrollment and school characteristics. The average school in our sample is fairly small, with 144 students. This survey covers only primary schools, so we observe enrollment only up to eighth grade. The physical plant variables indicate schools are not in very good repair. In an average school, only 70% of classrooms are noted to be in good condition by surveyors. Half of the schools report having a boundary wall, half report having electricity and slightly above half have a toilet. Eleven percent of the sample reports at least some instruction in English.
Panel B of
This data has several limitations. First, although it aims to be a complete census of schools in India, the coverage sample differs somewhat across years, indicating that some schools are missed in some years and it seems likely that others are missed completely. Because we run our regressions with school fixed effects we argue that this is not an issue for interpreting our estimates. The one note of caution, however, is that if the schools we observe are different than the schools we do not observe, our results may have limited generalizablity. This is unlikely to be a serious issue, however, since our best estimates suggest we cover nearly all schools in India. 15
A second issue is that the data measures total number of children enrolled, not enrollment rates. Given the evidence reported in the introduction, and in Section 4.3, that ITES centers are unlikely to have any noticeable impact on the population of children, this is should not be a major issue. However, for a small subset of school years the school also reported the total population of school-aged children in the area. The coverage of these data are limited, and it is unclear how the schools estimated total population. Nevertheless, in a robustness check we will use these data and the variable is summarized in Panel B of Table 1. Finally, as noted, the DISE data covers only primary schools. It seems plausible, even likely, that much of the impact of ITES centers would be on enrollment in high school, since secondary school education is typically necessary for these jobs, and secondary school enrollment is lower in general. Unfortunately, we do not observe these enrollments; if anything, this may lead us to understate our impacts.
Data on ITES Centers
To match with the data on education, we collected data on ITES centers. We contracted with a firm in India that helps connect Western firms with Indian ITES centers to create a directory of ITES centers in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu. They used their contacts, the Internet, and available directories to compile a list of firms, and called each to confirm their existence, the PIN code of their location and founding date.
This data collection project resulted in a dataset of 401 ITES centers. Figure 1 The breakdown of number of ITES centers by state is presented in Panel A of Table 2 . In Column 1 we show the count of all ITES centers; Andhra Pradesh is slightly less well-represented, but the number of ITES centers is fairly similar across states. In Column 2 we report these counts for areas outside the major cities of Bangalore, Chennai and Hyderabad (this is the sample we use for analysis). As expected, this limits the sample considerably, since most ITES centers are in major cities. We are left with 260 ITES centers. We choose this sample restriction because, given the large number of ITES centers in these cities, it is difficult to think of the introduction of one more as an event.
In order to undertake our analysis, we aggregate these ITES centers to the PIN code level. The first column in Panel B of Table 2 reports data on number of ITES centers by PIN code. The vast majority (97%) of PIN codes do not have any ITES centers; among those with at least one ITES center, the average is 2.6. Column 2 in Panel B shows these statistics with the data restricted to the sample we use (areas outside of the three major cities). This sample is similar, and the conditional mean is 2.5 ITES centers. Table 2 gives a better sense of the source of identification we use by showing three categories of schools. Our sample contains roughly 239,000 schools which are in PIN codes which never have ITES centers (or at least not ITES centers we observe). A further 172 schools are in PIN codes which have ITES centers, but do not add ITES centers during the survey period. Finally, we have 408 schools in PIN codes where the number of ITES centers change over the course of the study. Given that our specifications will include school fixed effects, we are identifying off of these final 408 schools. In general, we will include all schools in our analyses, and the non-changers will serve to identify the basic trends over time; in some analyses we will include only schools which ever have an ITES centers (a total sample of 580 schools).
Panel C of
In addition to this basic information on ITES center locations and founding dates, we undertook a follow-up survey of the centers in our sample. Although we attempted to survey all centers, in the end we were able to collect data on 83% (the remaining were missed largely due to refusal to answer survey questions). For these centers we have data on whether or not they are voice centers, whether they operate in English, the number of employees and several employee characteristics. Information on number of employees and whether they are voice or non-voice is available for all the centers we surveyed; demographic information is available for a subset.
The variables are summarized in Panel D of Table 2 . The ITES centers are relatively small, with a median of 80 employees, and about half of them have voice operations. All ITES centers which handle voice calls operate at least in part in English. Employees are young (median age of 28), largely without children and mostly from the local area.
As a final note, in addition to ITES centers within the same PIN code as the school, we use two variables measuring slightly further centers: those in the two closest PIN codes, and those in the 3rd to 5th closest PIN codes. To calculate distance, we use GPS data on PIN code locations (the latitude and longitude are measured at the post office in each PIN code). We count the number of ITES centers in each of the two neighboring groups. The two closest neighboring PIN codes are an average of 3.2 kilometers away, and 1,117 schools ever have an ITES center in one of these closest neighbors. The further neighbors are an average of 5.8 kilometers away, and 1,935 schools ever have an ITES center in one of these areas.
Placement of ITES Centers
A central issue in our analysis is the fact that ITES centers are not placed randomly. Our analysis will take advantage of variation over time, so any fixed differences across areas will be adjusted for, but it remains important to understand what drives placement.
We undertake two strategies. First, we can get an initial sense of the magnitude of this threat based on discussion with ITES center operators about location choices. The primary issues they cited when deciding where to locate were infrastructure and transportation: areas with no electricity and roads were not appealing places to operate. In addition, center operators cited their need to get high quality employees cheaply in the local area. There was some sense of a trade-off: there are more qualified individuals in larger cities, but people in more isolated areas (smaller cities, towns) demand lower wages. These discussions certainly do not suggest that ITES centers are placed randomly; it is clear that center operators are thinking carefully about cost-benefit considerations. However, the central demographics discussed are very likely to be constant over time, at least over the short time frame of our study.
We are also able to evaluate this endogenous placement statistically using our data. To do this we estimate, at the neighborhood/village level: (a) the determinants of having an ITES center by the end of the sample in 2007 and (b) the determinants of adding an ITES center during the period we observe. We focus on variables cited by ITES center operators: whether the area has electricity, whether it is in a more urban area and whether there is an English-language school in the area. This last variable is intended to capture the availability of English-speaking individuals. We also include a control for total school enrollment and, in some cases, state fixed effects.
The results from these regressions are shown in Table 3 . In general, the results support the interview evidence. More urban areas are more likely to have centers by 2007 and more likely to add them during the sample; these effects hold with and without state controls. Areas with English-language schools are also more likely to have centers and more likely to add them during the sample; again, this results is robust to state fixed effects. We see limited evidence that electricity matters, although this may be due to the high correlation with urbanization; enrollment also does not seem to have any impact.
The inclusion of school fixed effects means that any differences in levels of enrollment associated with these variables will not impact our results. However, if there are differential trends in enrollment across villages associated with these variables, this could impact our results. To address this, in the results below we will allow for separate year fixed effects for areas that are more urbanized and areas with any English-language schools; this is discussed in more detail in Section 3. 16
Empirical Strategy
We estimate the impact of ITES centers on school enrollment using a fixed effects estimator. We observe enrollment (total number of children enrolled) in school i in PIN code j at time t; denote this variable n ijt . In addition, we observe number of ITES centers in PIN code j at time t, which we denote c jt . Our basic regression is shown in Equation (1) below
where γ i is a vector of school fixed effects and φ t is a vector of date controls. These date controls include year fixed effects, and year fixed effects interacted with state fixed effects, village-level electricity, urbanization and controls for the number of English-language schools. Thus, we allow the year fixed effects to differ by state and by the variables that drive ITES center placement in Table 3 .
In addition to these fixed effects, we include a set of school-specific time-varying controls (X ijt ) measuring school-level infrastructure. The coefficient of interest is β 1 , which captures the effect of ITES centers on school enrollment. This coefficient is identified off of schools in areas which add ITES centers during the sample. Throughout the analysis, we cluster our standard errors at the neighborhood/village level. 17 We will also estimate several variations on this regression, including limiting to areas which are more likely to have centers, estimating the impact of having any centers and controlling for district-specific time trends.
As noted in the introduction, we are concerned in this analysis about the possibility that the results are driven by other variables which are changing over time and influence both ITES centers and school enrollment. A related issue is the possibility that ITES centers are introduced in places where school enrollment is increasing. To address both of these issues, we explore whether future ITES centers predict current enrollment. To do this, we estimate Equation (2) below.
where c j,t+1 is a variable measuring number of ITES centers in PIN code j in the next year. We argue that a finding that β 2 = 0 implies no pre-trends: that is, enrollment is not higher in areas that receive ITES centers in the future. It is important to note that this technique does not allow us to rule out the possibility that ITES centers are introduced at exactly the same time as another innovation, and that other innovation drives school enrollment. However, this possibility seems less plausible.
As a secondary pre-trend analysis, we also estimate Equation (2) including a trend for years until a new ITES center is introduced. This allows us to look slightly more generally at whether enrollments are increasing in years up to a new ITES center introduction.
One important issue is the coverage of our ITES center dataset. Although we worked to cover as many ITES centers as possible, it seems extremely unlikely that coverage is perfect. There are very likely areas that have ITES centers that we do not observe. This means that our "control" group of non-changers also contains some schools that should be in the "treatment" group. To the extent that there is a positive effect of ITES centers on school enrollment, this imperfect coverage should bias our estimates of β 1 downward, since the changes in the control group will be more biased upward by the inclusion of "treatment" schools.
Results: Impact of ITES Centers on School Enrollment
This section presents our estimates of the impact of ITES centers on enrollment. In the first subsection we summarize our basic results, report variations in the effect by demographic group and address the concern that the results we find are driven by pre-trends. The second subsection presents our results broken down by school language. The third subsection discusses whether our results are driven by mechanical changes in population or income.
Baseline Results, Pretrends
We For all four groups we isolate a balanced panel of schools which are observed for four years 18 The two groups of changer schools here (add center in 2005 and add center in 2006) cover the vast majority of schools which add centers; this is due largely to the meat of our schooling data being from this period. (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Using this sample of schools, we regress log enrollment on year fixed effects and take the residuals; this removes any consistent year-by-year variation. These residuals are graphed in Figure 2 , which show changes in these residuals relative to the level in 2004.
The key result in Figure 2 is that there are large year-on-year changes in enrollment in the two groups that add ITES centers during the sample, and these changes line up in terms of timing with the ITES center addition. In areas that add a center between 2004 and 2005, schools see a large increase in enrollment between these years, whereas there is only a small increase in schools that always have centers, and no change for schools that add centers later or never add them. 19 Further, for areas that add an ITES center between 2005 and 2006 there is a large increase in enrollment between these years, but no change in the year before. This is the only group with a large increase between 2005 and 2006. Overall, the figure demonstrates large changes in enrollment which correspond to ITES center introductions.
Panel A of Table 4 shows our statistical estimates of the effect of ITES centers on enrollment.
Column 1 presents our primary specification using the entire sample and controlling for school fixed effects, time-varying school infrastructure variables, year fixed effects and these year fixed effects interacted with several important determinants of ITES center placement. The coefficient on ITES centers is positive and significant: adding one more ITES center increases school enrollment by 5.7%.
Columns 2-4 of Panel A present several modifications on this regression. In Column 2 we include controls for district-specific trends to address the concern that districts that have ITES centers introduced are trending differently than those that do not. The coefficient is slightly smaller (4.3%) but within the margin of error of the estimate in Column 1. In Columns 3 and 4 we restrict the sample to areas that are arguably more comparable to the areas that get ITES centers. This ensures greater comparability between the "comparing" and "treatment" groups. Column 3 limits to villages/neighborhoods with at least one English-language school and Column 4 limits to areas that ever have an ITES center that we observe (including those that change and those that always have a center). In both of these restricted samples, the effect is larger and more significant. Perhaps most striking is the evidence in Column 4, which contains our most comparable set of schools: even though the sample size is restricted in this case, the effects are still large and significant.
In Panel B of Table 4 we estimate the same regressions, but instead of estimating the impact of number of ITES centers, we focus on a dummy for whether the area has any centers. The impacts are of similar size but less precise. The lower precision may be due to having more limited scope for identification with the more limited number of changes. We should note that this suggests that the results we observe do not arise only from the first ITES center introduction.
The results in Panels A and B focus on the impact of ITES centers introduced into the same PIN code as the school. In Panel C of Table 4 we explore whether the introduction of ITES centers in the slightly broader surroundings matter. As described, we do this by estimating the impact of ITES centers in the two closest neighboring PIN codes, and slightly further neighbors (the 3rd to 5th closest). Panel C demonstrates that there are some impacts for ITES centers in the nearest neighbors: one more ITES center in one of the closest neighboring PIN codes results in a 3.6% increase in enrollment in the primary specification. However, this impact is typically slightly smaller than for the own-PIN code centers. Further, the effects fall off very quickly. ITES centers in the slightly more distant neighbors have no significant impact; this is true even though these "distant" neighbors are still quite close, at an average of 5.8 kilometers away. This suggests effects are extremely localized.
The evidence in Table 4 suggests a strong connection between ITES centers and total number of children in school. In Appendix Table 1 we show these effects broken down by demographic group and state. We find the effects are similar for girls and boys and larger for older than younger children. The effects are similar for each state, although not significant in Andhra Pradesh or Karnataka, likely due to the more limited sample.
Pretrends
The central threat to the validity of our estimates is that pre-trends in enrollment or other variables drive our results. This is related to the issue of endogenous ITES center placement. As discussed above, to the extent that endogenous placement reflects only characteristics which are constant over time this will not drive our results since we include school fixed effects. Further, if trends are different for areas which are urban, or have more English-language schools, we have also addressed this concern. The concern which remains unaddressed in our main specification is the possibility that ITES centers are located in areas that are changing in other ways that we do not observe. We note that, anecdotally, nothing in discussions with center operators suggest this is the case.
To address this concern directly we estimate whether future ITES center placement predicts current enrollment. If ITES centers are being placed in areas in which other variables are changing, or in which enrollment is increasing in general, then we expect to observe future ITES center placement affecting current enrollment. This test is similar or identical to the tests for pre-trends in other comparable settings (Jensen and Oster, 2009; LaFerrara et al., 2009) . Table 5 replicates Panel A of Table 4 , but includes a control for the number of ITES centers in the following year in addition to the indicator for current ITES centers. Adding the control for future ITES centers has only a small impact on our estimates of the effect of current ITES centers. In addition, and more importantly, the effect of future ITES centers is small and not statistically precise, suggesting no strong evidence of pre-trends. We should note, however, that the estimates are too noisy to reject equality between the coefficients.
In Panel B of Table 5 we do a similar test, but rather than simply controlling for having an ITES center next year, we control for a time trend up to the year of ITES center introduction (the trend is defined so higher values indicate the center introduction is closer in time). If ITES centers are introduced into places where enrollment is increasing more quickly, we should see evidence of a positive trend. We do not see this. In Column 1, the coefficient on the trend is 0.002, indicating a 0.2% increase in enrollment for each year closer to the introduction of an ITES center. This is not significant, and is tiny relative to the 6.1% impact of introducing an ITES center. The trend is similarly insignificant and small in other columns. It is important to note that the results here do not indicate that ITES center placement is exogenous -this is ruled out by the evidence in Table 3 - but instead indicate that this endogenous placement does not drive our results.
Impacts of ITES Centers by Language of Instruction
The evidence above suggests that overall school enrollment increases in response to ITES center introduction. Here, we turn to separating the result by language of instruction. One of the most central features of ITES centers in India is that the vast majority operate in English. In our survey, all of the voice ITES centers (which make up about half of our sample) use English; the majority of non-voice centers also require English. Given this, to the extent that what we observe reflects changes in schooling in response to job opportunities, these changes should disproportionally result in higher English-language school enrollment. Again, existing literature suggests this is broadly the case. Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) show in English-language schooling in Mumbai over the past 20 years. We explore largely the same issue here, but at a much more localized level.
We separate our effects by language of instruction in Table 6 . To do this, we generate new variables interacting the number of ITES centers with language of instruction. We control separately for the impact of ITES centers on local language schools and on English-language schools. 20 Panel A of Table 6 shows our basic test of differences across school types. Column 1 reports impacts on total enrollment using the entire sample. We find the total impact of ITES centers in English-language schools is large and significant; the impact of ITES centers in local-language schools is effectively zero. Enrollment in English-language schools increases by 14.9% for each ITES center introduced.
The p-values reported at the bottom of the table indicate we can strongly reject the equality of the impacts in the two school types. In addition we estimate this regressions with district-specific trends (Column 2) and in the two restricted samples (Columns 3 and 4) . In all cases we see the same pattern of strong impacts on English-language schools and none for local-language. One thing which is important to note is that we do not see decreases in enrollment in local language schools. The increase in enrollment in English-language schools does not appear to come at the expense of enrollment in local-language schools.
In Panel B of Table 6 we push the data on language further, and separate schools into three groups: those that do not teach in English at all, those that teach some in English and some in another local language and those that teach only in English. We replicate Panel A, but control for each school type interacted with ITES centers. Consistent with the larger impact for English-language schools overall, we find the effects are largest for schools that teach exclusively in English. However, the difference between these and those that teach partially in English are small.
The largest distinction appears to be between schools that teach at least some English and those that teach none.
We can further explore whether the enrollment changes seem to reflect response to the ITES center jobs by using the distinction between voice and non-voice ITES centers in our sample. As noted in Section 2, our sample of ITES centers includes both centers that engage in voice activities (true "call centers") and those that engage in non-voice activities (data processing, software development, etc). Speaking English well is particularly valuable for jobs in voice centers. Although most non-voice centers also require English, they are slightly less likely to do so and the necessary level of English proficiency is lower.
We generate new variables measuring the number of voice and non-voice ITES centers in each 20 The two variables are mutually exclusive; each coefficient can be interpreted as the effect for that school type. PIN code; we define a center as a "voice center" if at least 50% of employees handle voice calls. 21 We interact each of these new variables with school language. Our goal in this regression is to test whether the differences between English-language and non-English-language schools are larger for voice than for non-voice centers. These regressions are reported in Panel C of Table 6 . In all four columns, the coefficients tell a similar story. For non-voice centers, the effects on English-language schools are slightly larger, but the difference is small. Both types of schools see enrollment increases from non-voice centers. For voice centers, however, the impact for English-language schools is much larger than for local-language schools. We can typically reject that the difference in effects for English-language and local language schools is the same for voice and non-voice center introductions.
Interestingly, in some specifications we see evidence of a reduction in enrollment in local-language schools when a voice ITES center is introduced; this could reflect students substituting between school types, which is not an effect we observe when we consider the impact of all ITES centers combined.
Before moving to robustness, it seems worthwhile to briefly discuss the magnitude of these results. The evidence in Table 6 points to a roughly 14.9% increase in number of students enrolled in response to an ITES center introduction. The median English-language school in an area with at least one ITES center has 158 students, implying an increase of about 23 students per school after an ITES center introduction. Aggregating to the PIN code level, we estimate the total increase in enrollment (which is entirely in English-language schools) of 400 students for each ITES center introduction.
Robustness: Number of Schools, Population and Income Changes
This subsection addresses several key robustness issues. In particular, we evaluate whether it is possible that our results are simply driven by mechanical changes in number of schools, population or income deriving from the ITES center introduction.
ITES Center Driven Population Increases
A key downside of our data on education is that we observe number of students enrolled, not enrollment rates. This introduces the possibility our results could be driven by population increases. The controls thus far rule out the concern that ITES center are introduced to more populous areas or ares which are growing faster. However, if the ITES center itself increases population, this could produce our result. This would be a concern if we were, for example, considering the impact of introducing a large manufacturing plant to an isolated area.
However, we argue it is unlikely to be a concern in this setting.
The main reason to reject this mechanism is that ITES centers tend to employ young, childless individuals. This can be seen in anthropological and ethnographic work on ITES centers in India (i.e. Ng and Mitter, 2005) and directly in our ITES center survey data. In the average center in our sample, managers reported fewer than 10% of employees have children (see Table 2 ), so the potential increase in children in the area even if all employees were new to the area is small. Further, relocation for work in ITES centers is also relatively rare (11.6% of employees). Even if we assume all this relocation is by people with children we find an average of 5.6% employees with children relocate; at the median ITES center, this amounts to 4 people with re-located children. In fact, this number is likely to be an upper bound; in reality, the individuals with children are generally the least likely to relocate. We argue that this calibration effectively rules out the possibility that ITES-center driven population increases drive our effects.
There remains a lingering concern that the introduction of an ITES center may bring with it other businesses, which could increase population. One issue is that businesses that serve ITES center workers could enter at the same time. Although this is plausible, it seems unlikely the effects would be large since the number of employees is very small compared to the overall population. It is also possible that the introduction of an ITES center is associated with an overall increase in other types of businesses, which bring in more migrants. The fact that we can reject pre-trends in the regressions above limits this concern; for this to drive our results, it must be the case that these other businesses enter at exactly the same time. In addition, we provide two other pieces of data to address this. Table 2 we show, for the subset of areas for which the school reports total area (neighborhood, village) population, the impact of controlling for population on our results. 22 We do not want to lean very heavily on the evidence in these regressions since we observe population only for a small subset of the sample and it is unclear how the school estimated population.
First, in Appendix
However, this table demonstrates that including a control for population in the regressions does not significantly impact our estimates. The coefficients are noisier, but this seems to be due to changes 
ITES Center Driven Changes in Number of Schools
A related concern is that our results are driven by changes in the number of schools in the area. If the introduction of an ITES center causes a decrease in the number of schools then the remaining schools could see enrollment increases even if the total enrollment rate in the area remains constant. We evaluate this by estimating the impact of ITES center introduction on the count of schools in the village. Estimates are shown in Appendix   Table 3 . The results indicate that changes in school count is not a concern: the impact on number of schools is very small, and not significant.
ITES Center Driven Changes in Income
A final possibility is that ITES centers drive enrollment because they increase income and schooling is a normal good. To evaluate the contribution of income to the increase in school enrollment, we take advantage of the fact that existing literature has provided estimates of the income elasticity of school enrollment in similar contexts. Using these estimates, alongside estimates of the increased income generated by new ITES centers, we can estimate the predicted enrollment increase resulting from income changes. This is done in Table 7 . We begin by showing (in the top row) several estimates from existing literature of the income elasticity of school enrollment in the developing world (Alderman et al., 2001; Glick and Sahn, 2000; Glewwe and Jacoby, 2004; Orazem and King, 2007) . In the second row, we show our estimate of the percentage increase in income generated by ITES centers; this is the same in all columns. Details of this calculation are in Appendix A. This increase is very small.
Although ITES centers pay quite well, they simply do not employ a large number of people.
The first and second rows together allow us to calculate the expected change in enrollment given the change in income. The predicted percent increase in enrollment ranges from 0.17% to 0.84%. Our actual enrollment increase is 5.7%, an order of magnitude larger; even at the largest elasticity estimates in the literature, it is unlikely that much more than a tenth of the effect is explained by income increases. 24
Similar to the case of population, an auxiliary concern is that the ITES center brings other businesses, which also increase income. It is more difficult to rule this out than in the population case. However, that the fact that we do not see evidence of pre-trends suggests that these new businesses would need to arrive at exactly the same time as the ITES centers. In addition, given the very small share of the effect which is plausibly explained by ITES center income, in order for income overall to explain a larger share, these other businesses would need to swamp the ITES centers in their income contribution, which seems unlikely.
Mechanisms: Localized Information versus Localized Returns
We draw several conclusions based on the results in Section 4. The introduction of an ITES center to an area results in an increase in school enrollment and this increase is concentrated in English-language schools. The observed increase does not appear to be driven by mechanical changes in the number of schools, population or income. Finally, these changes are very localized: ITES centers even slightly further away have a limited or zero impact on enrollment. Based on these results, we argue that the effects we observe reflect responses to changes in the perceived returns to schooling after the introduction of new local job opportunities.
In this section we provide some initial evidence on the mechanisms that drive this effect. We distinguish two possibilities. First, the introduction of an ITES center may impact actual returns to schooling by providing new jobs at that center. Alternatively, it may impact perceived returns to schooling by providing better information about these jobs in general, even if the change in actual job opportunities is limited. This distinction is potentially important for thinking about the policy implications of these results. In this section we use a supplementary dataset which we collected in Madurai District (in Tamil Nadu) to provide some evidence on this question.
To fix ideas, consider the simplest model of schooling decision-making in a context with no information frictions. Assume there are two locations, A and B, both of which begin with no ITES centers and otherwise identical job opportunities and education costs. Assume education is a binary choice which carries some positive wage returns. At some date, an ITES center is introduced into area A and (because we are assuming information is shared fully) it is immediately observable to individuals in both areas. The existence of this center increases the wage returns to education while education costs remain the same.
For individuals in area A, the value of education increases by the full amount of the increased wage returns. For individuals in area B, however, the increase is less because to take advantage of the new jobs, they would need to migrate to area A. Assuming the cost of migration is positive, the reaction of individuals in area B to the ITES center should be smaller than in area A; how much smaller depends on migration costs. Note that these migration costs could be the cost of moving to live in a new area, or the cost of travel to work in that area. Now consider adding information frictions so the information about the increased returns diffuse only partially (or not at all) between areas A and B. In this case, the response in area B will be less than in area A even if costs of migration are small ; how much less will depend on how limited information diffusion is. This suggests that the key to distinguishing between these models is to first get a sense of whether migration is possible or common across these local areas. To the extent that the costs of migration appear to be small, we turn to the information story, and analyze how quickly information decays with ITES center distance. It is very important to keep in mind the distances we are discussing are very small, with the impact of ITES centers decaying significantly within a few kilometers. This means when we consider the costs of migration or information decay, we are considering these factors over a very small distance.
Evidence on Mechanisms: Survey Data from Madurai
The DISE data do not provide evidence that would allow us to observe either costs of migration/travel or information. To get at these mechanisms, therefore, we fielded a short survey in Madurai District in Tamil Nadu. Madurai is a small city about 450 kilometers from Chennai with several ITES centers. We surveyed 1000 individuals: 500 in Madurai itself and 250 in each of two smaller towns, Thirumangalam and Peraiyur, which were about 20 and 50 kilometers away, respectively. We collected data including distance to work, future plans for children and knowledge of ITES centers. Importantly, we collected GPS data on location of households and ITES centers, allowing us to calculate exact distances. Details of the survey appear in Appendix B.
Evidence on Costs of Travel and Migration
Our DISE evidence is on enrollment of children in primary school. In order to conclude that large costs of migration explain the decay of the effect over distance, two things must be true. First, it must be unusual for people to travel more than a few kilometers for work; if a large share of people travel more than that, it suggests the labor market is not as localized as the ITES center impacts.
Second, it must also be unusual for children to live more than a few kilometers away when they leave home. If it is possible or likely that a large share of children will live some distance away when they are working as adults, and people have perfect information, they should respond to returns in more distant areas.
By and large, the data does not support either of these requirements. The median person in our sample who is working reports working 2 kilometers away from where they live; 25% work more than 6 kilometers away. Among people with at least ten years of schooling -presumably most likely to work at high wage jobs like ITES centers -the median person reports working 4 kilometers away and 25% work more than 10 kilometers away. This suggests that it is not unusual to travel reasonable distances to work. 25 Further evidence comes from the data on child migration. Among children of the sample participants who are over 18, roughly 40% of them live away from home, and 25% live more than 5 kilometers away. Further, there is evidence that parents expectations line up with this: when asked where they expect their child to live after they are married, 54% of respondents report they expect the child to live at least in a different neighborhood, and 25% report they expect the child to live in a different district.
The evidence on migration is echoed by larger datasets. Data from the National Family and Health Survey shows that among working individuals aged 20-35 with at least a secondary school education, roughly 30% have moved in the last five years. Similarly, in the 2001 Census, 29.9% of all persons were living in a town other than that of their birth.
Taking this evidence together, it seems very unlikely that our DISE results reflect localized changes in actual returns; the evidence simply does not support the claim of such localized labor markets.
Evidence on Information Diffusion
We turn now to the question of whether limited information diffusion might explain our results. We focus on relating distance to an ITES center (calculated based on GPS coordinates) to two pieces of data reported by the households: knowledge about ITES centers and whether parents plan on ITES center jobs for their children. At the end of this subsection we show some auxiliary evidence on distance and reported "returns to schooling".
Knowledge of ITES Centers
We begin with with the evidence on knowledge. We focus on five variables: whether the respondent reports knowing anyone who works in an ITES center, whether they report that there is an ITES center within the "local area" 26 and three measures of their knowledge about ITES center job qualifications. The job qualification questions listed a set of characteristics (e.g. speak English, college graduate) and asked individuals whether these were "required" for jobs in an ITES center; in some cases, the correct answer was yes, and in others it was no. We generate three measures of knowledge: the share of questions for which individuals reported they "didn't know" whether the qualification was required, the share of the true qualifications they correctly identified and the share of the false qualifications they correctly identified. 27 Appendix B reports summary statistics on the variables.
We begin by looking at how knowledge varies between Madurai, the district capital (which has some ITES centers), and the two smaller towns of Thirumangalam and Peraiyur (neither of which have any ITES centers). Panel A of Table 8 reports summary statistics for each of the three areas.
As expected, we find knowledge of ITES centers is much greater in Madurai than the other two areas. For example, 34% of respondents in Madurai report knowing someone who works in a ITES center, versus 9.6% in Thirumangalam and 6.4% in Peraiyur. Those in Madurai are more likely to know of an ITES center in the local area. In the case of knowledge, nearly all individuals in all areas are able to correctly identify the true required qualifications, but those in Madurai are more likely to reject the false qualifications, consistent with having better information.
Although somewhat informative, the evidence in Panel A relies on comparing across areas which are different for other reasons (e.g. income, distance to major cities), which could drive these differences. Moreover, the evidence in the DISE data points to variation in response over much smaller distances; if information explains this variation, we should see differences in information even within Madurai. To explore this, we estimate regressions within Madurai with simple demographic controls. Panel B of Table 8 uses all of the Madurai data and estimates coefficients on two dummies: being within a half a kilometer of the closest ITES center and being between 0.5 and 1.5 kilometers away; the omitted category is between 1.5 and 3 kilometers away.. We see that knowledge is the highest in areas within a half a kilometer of the ITES center on four of the five measures, which is consistent with the evidence from the DISE data of effects decaying over relatively short distances.
The exception is when we explore impacts on the share of people who correctly identify true qualifications where nearly everyone gets a perfect score.
We can get a visual sense of the patterns within Madurai in Appendix Figures 1-5 , which show smoothed plots of the knowledge outcomes against distance from the closest ITES center. For the same four measures, we see strong evidence that information deteriorates quickly in the area right around the ITES center. Between 0 and 2 kilometers, moving further away decreases knowledge.
Consistent with the estimate on the second dummy in the regressions in Panel B, there is some evidence that people who live much further away (between 2 and 3 kilometers) have better information. This seems to be due to the fact that these individuals are in a neighborhood that, while (relatively) far from any one center is also the closest neighborhood to the one very large ITES center in Madurai. This appears to increase the chance of knowing of a center in the area, although there is no impact on their ability to identify qualifications, suggesting the information they gain is more superficial. 28
In Panels C and D of Table 8 we take this analysis one step further and estimate the impact of distance to an ITES center on knowledge within more limited areas. As we squeeze the data in on smaller areas we increase the comparability across individuals, as well as the comparability across the ITES centers they are exposed to. Our ideal is to get as close as possible to the "experiment" of comparing two individuals who are slightly different distances from a single ITES center. We approximate this ideal with a sample restriction. Panel C limits the data to households within 1 kilometers of an ITES center; Panel D limits to those within 0.5 kilometers.
Despite the small sample sizes (especially in Panel D), in all regressions we see a highly significant relationship between distance and knowledge. Individuals who are closer to an ITES center (so distance is smaller) are more likely to report knowing someone who works at one of these businesses, and more likely to report one in the local area. Further, those who are closer to an ITES center are less likely to report they don't know what qualifications are required and more likely to reject the false qualifications. Consistent with the evidence in Panels A and B, there is less impact on whether they correctly identify true qualifications. This suggests that the largest impact of the ITES center is to correct perceptions about what is needed to work there. The evidence in Panel D suggests that even within a half a kilometer of an ITES center, being closer increases knowledge, this suggests that information decays with distance even within an extremely small area.
Child Job Choices Our second piece of evidence on information focuses on job choices for children. In the survey, we asked individuals about the most likely jobs for their child; they were given a list of possible jobs and asked to list three options. We focus on whether they choose the job "Call Center/BPO Worker" as the most likely job and analyze how proximity to an ITES center impacts this variable. We argue this gets more directly at the question of whether proximity to an ITES center changes plans for children. There are at least two caveats to the child data, both related to the fact that we asked these questions only to respondents with at least one child between the ages of 5 and 15 who was currently enrolled in school. First, sample sizes are smaller here. In addition, since enrollment declines as children age, there is more selection in the older sample; given this, we run regressions on the whole sample and limited to children ages 5-10. Again, we start by comparing Madurai with the other two towns. Respondents in Madurai much more frequently report this as the most likely job for their children: 7.1% of respondents in Madurai report this, versus 1.9% in Thirumangalam and 1.2% in Peraiyur. As in the case of knowledge, the more interesting comparison is by distance within Madurai. Panel A of Table 9 reports regression results from the Madurai-only sample. Column 1 uses the entire sample and estimates coefficients on the two distance dummies; controls are child sex and age, head of household education and whether the respondent reports that call centers are one of the three listed jobs with the highest wages. This first regression shows no evidence that proximity to ITES centers matters for whether parents envision this job for their children. In Column 2, however, when we limit to younger children we see a strongly positive impact of being close to an ITES center.
The difference across age groups could reflect differential selection. It is also possible that this difference reflects the fact that schooling choices are more malleable for younger children -for example, it might still be possible to switch them to an English school. To get some sense of this, in Columns 3 and 4 we interact distance with whether the child is enrolled in an English-language school (controlling for the overall English-language impact). These results are more striking. For both the overall sample and for the younger children, we observe that for children enrolled in an English-language school, proximity to an ITES center strongly impacts whether the parent reports that an ITES center job is likely. The fact that this occurs for the overall sample in addition to the younger children suggests that the lack of impact for the total sample in Column 1 is due to lack of language flexibility among older children.
Overall, this table suggests that there is an increase in perceived chance of ITES center jobs for children when an ITES center is closer. Again, this points to a very sharp decay of information about these jobs even over small distances.
Returns to Schooling and Reported Changes in Behavior As a final note, we present two more speculative pieces of evidence that are supportive of the information story. The first is on returns to schooling. We asked individuals their "best guess" about the the monthly wage in the area for someone with a secondary school degree and for someone with only primary school; we define "returns to schooling" as the simple difference between these two values. Panel B of Table 9 regresses this returns to schooling measure on the distance measures, both the distance dummies (Column 1) and the measure of distance to the closest center, with the sample limited to ares within 1 kilometer (Column 2). In both cases, we see evidence that proximity to an ITES center impacts perceived returns. Areas within a half a kilometer of an ITES center report monthly returns that are are 370 Rs higher than more distant areas. This is a large effect: the average in the areas more than half a kilometer away is 733 Rs. Even within 1 kilometer of the ITES center (Column 2) moving closer increases perceived returns.
The second piece of evidence comes from the last question on the survey. For the 131 individuals in the sample who reported knowing of an ITES center in the local area, we asked whether they had made any change in response to that center introduction. Of course, it is extremely difficult to interpret the response to questions like this, especially given that it was asked at the end of the survey, which leaves open concerns about priming. However, the results are striking. About 50% report intentions to increase schooling for their children, some of whom cite specifically that they will enroll their children in English-language schools. It is interesting to note that this is the only behavior change reported -there is no mention of individuals getting jobs at ITES centers -which is consistent with the evidence in Section 4.3 that these centers probably do not have large impacts on current income. 29 We argue that the evidence in this section suggests that the localized impact of ITES centers that we observe in the DISE data reflect limited information diffusion rather than localized labor markets. The distances traveled for work, and the chance that children live some distance away when they are older, are sufficiently high that it seems implausible that there are large costs of "migration" to jobs a few kilometers away. On the other hand, the evidence on information suggests that knowledge of ITES centers and expectations about the possibility of children working there decay very rapidly as households move away from these centers, which is exactly what we would expect if information diffuses slowly or not at all across space.
Conclusion
In this paper we argue that the introduction of ITES centers in India have large impacts on school enrollment, and these impacts are concentrated in the very local area around the ITES center. We argue this effect is causal, and is not driven by pre-trends or mechanical changes in number of schools, population or income. The very local nature of our analysis and the fine timing of the effects are helpful in ruling out the concern that pre-trends in other variables drive the impacts we see.
Further, we provide some suggestive evidence that the very localized nature of the impacts may reflect limited information about non-local job opportunities; we argue this is more likely than the claim that these new job opportunities only impact local returns to schooling.
These results relate to a larger literature on promoting schooling increases in the developing world. To get a sense of magnitude, we can compare the results here to other interventions designed to increase schooling. Our overall estimate indicates that an additional ITES center prompts a 5.7% increase in school enrollment; based on an enrollment rate of around 80% this amounts to an increase in enrollment rate of around 4.1 percentage points. This number is comparable to enrollment effects of other interventions designed to increase schooling in the developing world. For example, the conditional cash transfers in PROGRESA increased schooling 3.4-3.6 percentage points (Schultz, 2004) . A program in Kenya which provided school uniforms to girls in Kenya (worth about 1.75% of average yearly income) increased enrollment by 6 percentage points (Evans, Kremer and Ngatia, 2008 ). Miguel and Kremer (2004) found that administering deworming drugs decreased absence by 7 percentage points, although they do not report effects on enrollment.
From a policy standpoint, the results provide support for interventions which inform students about returns to schooling (as in Jensen, 2010a and 2010b) . In the absence of this type of policy, we would expect short-term gains in enrollment to be concentrated around areas with local ITES centers; the evidence in Section 5 suggests this concentration could be limited by broader information sharing. (1) and (2) is the number of ITES centers in 2007; in Columns (3) and (4) it is whether any centers were added during the sample period. Standard Errors in Parentheses, clustered at the village level. * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1% (1), (3) and (4); clustered errors could not be estimated when district trends are included in Column (2). * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1%. (1), (3) and (4); clustered errors could not be estimated when district trends are included in Column
(2). * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1%. Notes: Income elasticity estimates from (1) Glewwe and Jacoby (2004), (2) Glick and Sahn (2000), (3) Orazem and King (2007) , and (4) Alderman et al. (2001) . Appendix A reports details on how we calculate Row 2. Madurai. Dependent variables are the same in all panels (titles abbreviated in Panels B-D). Controls: head of household education and number of assets held by household (television, radio, refrigerator, and toilet). In panel B, the omitted category is more than 1.5 km away from a call center. Thirumangalam is located 20 km from Madurai, and Peraiyur is 50 km away. Columns 3-5 rely on answers to a set of six questions about qualifications which are "required" for job in an ITES center. Details are in Section 5. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1%. Controls: head of household education and age, asset ownership (television, radio, refrigerator, toilet).
Notes: Data comes from the survey run in Madurai District, Tamil Nadu. All regressions are limited to households within Madurai. The omitted distance category is more than 1.5 kilometers away. In panel B, returns to schooling is calculated based on questions in the survey about what the respondent thinks the average person with a secondary school education earns in a month in Madurai, and the same for the average person with a primary school education.
Our measure of the estimated returns to secondary school is simply the difference between these two answers. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1%.
Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 1 Parentheses, clustered at the village level. * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1%
Appendix: Not for Publication
Appendix Notes: This table shows the impact of ITES centers controlling for population. Population is reported by a subset of school-years, and is reported by the school as the village population. In cases where the school does not report population but other schools in the village do report population we use the average population among reporter schools as population for all schools in the village. Panel A does not control for population but limit the sample to school-years in which population is observed. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the village level. * significant at 10% * * significant at 5% * * * significant at 1%.
